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Abstract
As a novel technology, cloud computing attracts
more and more people including technology enthusi-
asts and malicious users. Different from the classical
network architecture, cloud environment has many
its own features which make the traditional defense
mechanism invalid. To make the network more robust
against a malicious attack, we introduce a new method
to mitigate this risk efficiently and systematically. In
this paper, we first propose a coupled networks model
which adequately considers the interactions between
physical layer and virtual layer in a practical cloud
computing environment. Based on this new model
and our systematical method, we show that with the
addition of protection of some specific nodes in the
network structure, the robustness of cloud computing’s
network can be significantly improved whereas their
functionality remains unchanged. Our results demon-
strate that our new method can effectively settle the
hard problems which cloud computing now is facing
without much cost.
1. Introduction
The flourish of cloud computing technology nowa-
days is largely due to its outstanding features, on-
demand self-service, resource pooling, rapid elastic-
ity, etc.[1] All users in cloud environment share a
public pool of configurable and virtualized computing
resources, such as CPUs, disks or network. Users can
easily scale-up or scale-down their cloud resources
according to their real time demands. For example,
before the landing of NASA’s Curiosity rover, IT en-
gineers are allowed to deploy as many servers running
on the AWS (Amazon Web Services) cloud as they
need. Then, when they are done, they may shut down
additional servers to avoid paying for those resources
[2]. Besides, the centralization of servers makes cloud
computing technology more environment friendly and
energy saving. Compared to setting up their own data
center, individuals and enterprises are now becoming
more favorable to deploy their businesses on cloud
[3] [4]. Cloud computing has leveraged users from
hardware requirements, while reducing overall client
side requirements and complexity [5].
As the fast growth of cloud computing, security
issues are considered as the obstacles on the highway,
which largely hinder the big enterprises’ wills of
porting their business from traditional data center to
cloud. Apparently, the security of cloud computing
seems to be improved due to the centralization of data
and increased security-focused resources [6]. The fact,
however, is that the security of cloud computing now is
considered still in infancy [7], especially the network
security which faces many new challenges.
Generally, to protect an enterprise network against
cyber-attack, we traditionally adopt network security
devices such as firewalls, DMZ hosts or intrusion
detection systems (IDS) [8]. These traditional network
defense strategies, however, can not be applied to cloud
computing environment adaptively due to not only
the attacks can rise internally but also the dynamic
and elastic features of cloud computing [9]. To settle
such problems, new methods are proposed continually
in the past years, such as distributed cloud intrusion
detection model proposed by Irfan Gul and M. Hus-
sain[10], integrating an IDS into cloud computing en-
vironment proposed by Claudio Mazzariello, Roberto
Bifulco and Roberto Canonico[11] or control the inter-
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communication among virtual machines method pro-
posed by Hanqian Wu, Yi Ding[12], etc.
These novel methods, however, merely try to rein-
force cloud computing’s internal network via porting
traditional network defense means. Such methods are
not only unsystematic but also impossible to imple-
ment when the scale of physical hosts reaches at
least half million [13]. Besides, once the cyber-attack
causes some VMs overloaded which in turn causes
physical hosts which they reside overloaded, all the
services on this overloaded physical hosts will be
affected or even be corrupted. Moreover, due to the
logical coupling between VMs in a common virtual
sub-network, for example, the coupling relationship
between load-balancers and servers or between servers
and databases, disasters will spread dramatically and
then quickly collapse a large part of cloud network.
In this paper, we first propose a new two layers
model to describe the cloud’s complex internal network
with the full consideration of the interactions between
physical and virtual networks. Based on this model and
complex network theory, a novel solution is introduced
to systematically and globally settle such a problem
that the traditional network defense strategies are no
longer suitable for cloud. This solution can make the
whole network in cloud computing environment more
robust to resist the malicious cyber attacks and to
maintain the infrastructures as operatively as possible,
even before collapsing.
2. Avalanche Effect in Cloud Computing’s
Cyber Attack
Different from the traditional networks, network in
cloud computing environment can be divided into two
layers: the virtual layer and the physical layer. The
physical layer contains chunks of physical network
facilities, such as switchers, routers, severs or other
common network devices. The virtual layer, however,
is built on the physical layer and is implemented via
various virtualization technologies, such as container
technologies, virtual machine technologies or software
define network technologies [14]. All these virtual
resources, such as VM instances, distributed databases
or distributed storage, run on physical hosts and are
inter-connected via virtual networks which also run on
some physical hosts [15]. Fig 1 shows the relationship
between virtual and physical layers.
Due to the sharing of physical resource pool, crash
of one VM instance can cause other VM instances
on the same physical host to collapse. Furthermore,
because of the logical coupling of different compo-
nents in a sub-virtual network, such collapsing may
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Figure 1. The relationship between virtual and
physical layer in the network of cloud computing.
On the physical layer, servers or other physical
devices are applied to various virtualization tech-
nologies to service for the virtual layer. The virtual
layer, on the other hand, doesn’t know the exist of
physical layer. Various virtual sub-networks coexist
with each other in the virtual layer, each of them is
deployed by cloud user for different purpose.
spread along different paths on both physical layer
and virtual layer. This process is the avalanche effect
in cloud computing’s cyber attack. Fig. 2 shows the
avalanche process when only one VM instance in the
network is attacked by malicious hacker. According to
the complex network theory, such avalanche effect can
ruin a network rapidly, even the scale of a network is
really large [16].
3. Model of Cloud Computing’s Network
3.1. Modeling Virtual and physical layer
In the real cloud environment, VM instances and
other virtual components compose the virtual sub-
network which represents a full functional application,
such as a web application or scientific computing
platform. The whole virtual layer consists of various
VM
Attacker
Virtual
Layer
VM
VM
VM
VM
VMVM
VM
Physical
Layer
Network Infrastructure
VM
VM1
VM2
VM3
Compute 
Node
VM1
VM2
VM3
Compute 
Node
VM1
VM2
VM3
Compute 
Node
Storage 
Node
VM
Attacker
Virtual
Layer
VM
VM
VM
VM
VMVM
VM
Physical
Layer
Network Infrastructure
VM
VM1
VM2
VM3
Compute 
Node
VM1
VM2
VM3
Compute 
Node
VM1
VM2
VM3
Compute 
Node
Storage 
Node
VM
Attacker
Virtual
Layer
VM
VM
VM
VM
VMVM
VM
Physical
Layer
Network Infrastructure
VM
VM1
VM2
VM3
Compute 
Node
VM1
VM2
VM3
Compute 
Node
VM1
VM2
VM3
Compute 
Node
Storage 
Node
VM
Attacker
Virtual
Layer
VM
VM
VM
VM
VMVM
VM
Physical
Layer
Network Infrastructure
VM
VM1
VM2
VM3
Compute 
Node
VM1
VM2
VM3
Compute 
Node
VM1
VM2
VM3
Compute 
Node
Storage 
Node
A B
D C
Figure 2. The avalanche process when cloud
computing’s is under a cyber attack. Initially, in
(A), only one VM is attacked. Due to coupling
of physical layer and virtual layer, however, other
VMs which beside the ruined ones can be affected
or even be collapsed with a probability P. This
process will continue until no more new ones. After
this avalanche process, in the worst case, all VMs
in the network is in an invalid state (D).
virtual sub-networks that have different scales. In this
article, we use scale-free network to model such a
virtual sub-network, due to the fact that many kinds
of practical computer networks, including the internet
and local area networks, are all scale-free [17]. Here,
we suppose that the distribution of virtual sub-virtual
networks with different scale obey the Power Law
distribution, i.e. the larger the virtual sub-network is,
the litter it appears [18]. After this, we can deploy these
virtual components onto physical machines randomly.
The modeling process can be divided into two steps:
1) Generate various scale-free networks whose scale
distribution obey the Power Law distribution. Each
vertex in this network represents a virtual component,
such as VM instance on which runs different services.
2) Create the two-layers model by adding physical
vertices into the network and randomly add edges
between these physical vertices and the vertices in
virtual layer.
3.2. Simplify the model
To apply complex network methods to the model,
we need to simplify the two layers’ model into single
layer. Ignoring the specific functions of facilities in
the two layers, all virtual or physical components
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Figure 3. Simplify two-layers network to single-
layer network. This simplification ignores the con-
nection between the physical vertices due to that
the virtual layer network is built on the physical
layer network. After this simplification, for the one-
layer network, we can employ the classical com-
plex network analysis method to settle the problem
that we have encountered.
in cloud can be treated as a vertex in network, and
inter-connections between vertices can be abstracted
as edges. Due to that virtual network is built on the
physical network, edges between vertices on physical
layer can be omitted. So, this two-layer network can
be further simplified to a single layer network as we
can see from Fig. 3 [19]. This simplification reduces
the complexity of analysis and makes it possible to use
the mature complex network theory and tools.
Then, we come to analyze the robustness of this
system. We usually use the size of giant component
after initially removing a fraction q of nodes to mea-
sure the robustness of a network. First, we consider
the situation in which no immune nodes are set up
to guarantee the function of the whole network. Bond
percolation process can be a great tool to model the
dynamic process in the system. Edges are occupied
only when the end nodes of the edges are not initially
removed and both the end nodes are not infected (node
i are infected with probability 1 − Pimu(i), we will
discuss it later). We define pii(s) as the probability
that node i belongs to a small clusters of exactly s
nodes. Since the network is sparse enough, we can
assume that the network topology is locally tree-like.
This means that in the limit of large network size an
arbitrarily large neighborhood around any nodes takes
the form of a tree, then the calculation using message-
passing algorithms can give a good approximation of
the clusters.
Assuming that the networks to be locally tree-like,
according to Brian Karrer and M. E. J. Newman’s
recent theory [22], pii(s) can be write as:
pii(s) =
∑
{sj :j∈Ni}
[ ∏
j∈Ni
pii←j(si)
]
δ
(
s− 1,
∑
j∈Nj
sj
)
(1)
Where δ(a, b) is the kronecker delta which is defined
as follows:
δ(a, b) =
{
0 a− b = 0
1 a− b 6= 0 (2)
We can now introduce a probability generating func-
tion Gi(z) =
∑∞
s=1 pii(s)z
s , whose value is given by
[22]:
Gi(z) =
∞∑
s=1
zs
∑
{sj :j∈Ni}
[ ∏
j∈Ni
pii←j(sj)
]
δ(s− 1,
∑
j∈Ni
sj)
= z
∏
j∈Ni
∞∑
sj=0
pii←j(sj)zsj
(3)
We can simplify the equation as [22]:
Gi(z) = z
∏
j∈Ni
Hi←j(z) (4)
Where
∏
j∈Ni Hi←j(z) =
∑∞
s=0 pii←j(s)z
s.
To calculate Hi←j(z), we note that pii←j(s) is zero
if the edge between i and j is unoccupied (with
probability 1 − pi←j) and nonzero otherwise (pi←j),
which means that pii←j(0) = 1− pi←j in which:
pi←j = (1− η)2Pimu(j) (5)
Where η stands for the fraction of nodes initially
removed. And for s ≥ 1:
pii←j(s) = pi←j
∑
{sk:k∈Nj\i}
[ ∏
k∈Nj\i
pij←k(sk)
]
δ(s− 1,
∑
k∈Nj\i
sk)
(6)
Where the Nj\i denotes that the set of neighbors of j
without i. Substituting this equation into the definition
of Hi←j(z) above, we then find that:
Hi←j(z) = 1− pi←j + pi←jz
∏
k∈Nj\i
Hj←k(z) (7)
Then the expected fraction S of the network occu-
pied by the entire percolating cluster is given by the
average over all nodes:
S =
1
n
∞∑
i=1
[
1−Gi(1)
]
= 1− 1
n
n∑
i=1
∏
j∈Ni
Hi←j(1)
(8)
Setting z = 1 in equation (7) we have:
Hi←j(1) = 1− pi←j + pi←j
∏
j∈Nj\i
Hi←j(1) (9)
We can calculate the size of the remaining greatest
connected component of the networks, i.e. the perco-
lating cluster by solving this equation.
3.3. Vertices with immune ability
Some nodes in this network may have the immune
ability against malicious attacks due to that they are
well protected by some virtual network security equip-
ments which are deployed by professional network ad-
ministrators. Usually, large corporations have enough
money and awareness to employ professional security
counselors and managers to protect their IT facilities
(physical or virtual) from cyber-attacks. According to
this common sense, in our model, vertices in a large
virtual sub-network will have a high probability to
avoid crash when they are attacked by hackers. The
immunity probability Pimu of a specific node V can
be calculated as:
Pimu = 1− S
T
· C (10)
where S is the number of vertices in a virtual sub-
network which node V belongs to and T is the number
of vertices in the whole virtual layer. Coefficient C
stands for that even a virtual sub-network is well
protected, it is also possible to be ruined inevitably
by some cases.
3.4. Solution
To enhance the robustness of cloud computing net-
work, we may place some key vertices behind virtual
network security components, such virtual firewall, vir-
tual IDS etc. [21] In our virtual layer model, we don’t
take account of virtual network security components
due to that they are transparent to the application users
and can’t be attacked directly. Virtual network security
components can be deployed rapidly and conveniently
without much more consumptions. The key vertices
which are selected to protect are that have the highest
degrees in the network. Usually, vertex has high de-
gree somehow means that they are important or even
crucial.
Figure 4. This figure is referenced from Firewall-
as-a-Service (FWaaS) overview of Openstack
Cloud Administrator Guide [20]. In this figure, VM2
is protected by a virtual firewall. In our model,
we can place such key nodes behind the security
components.
To simulate the crashing process, initially, we ran-
domly remove some vertices from the network to
simulate that some VMs are ruined. Then all the
vertices which are the neighbors of crashed nodes are
affected. Due to that each node in the network has
its own immune coefficient which we have mentioned
before, the neighboring nodes may survive and avoid
crashing during the process. These new crashed nodes
in turn affected their own neighbors. This process will
continue until the system reaches a stable state that
no more vertices are affected. In each spreading step,
we use the number of nodes in the largest connected
cluster to represents the current state of network.
Based on the model we have discussed before, we
now consider the situation with immune nodes which
are totally immune to the infections and will never
collapse with some protection. In this paper, we select
the nodes with greatest degrees as the immune nodes.
As the introduce of immune nodes into the system,
there will be some changes for pi←j .
p′i←j = (1−η)2
(
1−
[
1−Pimu(j)
]
(1−Pj∈B)
)
(11)
Where Pj∈B stands for the probability that j is in
the selected group of immune nodes. If the immune
nodes are randomly selected, Pj∈B = η for all j and
η is the fraction of protected nodes. It is obvious that
pi←j < p′i←j , thus the expectation of size of giant
component will be greater. In this paper, we selected
the nodes with greatest degrees as immune nodes. Thus
Pj∈B will be a function of its degree and η . And
if j is in the group with greatest degrees, the effect
of protecting this node will be greater .Therefore the
network will be more robust.
4. Results
From what we have discussed in the above sections,
we can conclude that as long as the immune nodes
are added into the network, the probability of existing
larger cluster is improved as well. To verify the ro-
bustness improvement after applying our novel method
to cloud computing’s network, we have simulated this
avalanche process with different ratio of initial immune
nodes and initial attacked nodes. We use 5000 physical
hosts with 10 VM instances running on each of them to
simulate the attack process. Here, we assume that the
largest scale of virtual sub-network contains at most
500 VM instances.
The results in Fig. 5 show that the number of key
nodes that have the ability to resist the cyber-attack will
finally affect the robustness of the whole network, and
the initial number of attacked nodes also affects the
network’s robustness. As the ratio of initial attacked
nodes increase, the number of survived nodes in the
largest connected cluster decrease accordingly. Also,
with different ratio of protected nodes, the robustness
(measured by the number of nodes in the largest
connected cluster) of network varies significantly. The
more the nodes are protected, the higher the robustness
is. Fig. 5 demonstrates that if we only select 5% (2500
VMs, 250 physical hosts) key nodes to give the ability
to resist the cyber-attack, the ratio of final survived
nodes to the total nodes can increased over 40% or
even 70%. Also, if we protect 20% key nodes, this
ratio will stably over 60% and in some optimistic cases
it will over 90% (0.5% nodes initially be attacked).
In practice, benefited from the elastic and dynamic
features of cloud computing, nodes can by rapidly pro-
tected by virtual network security devices on demand.
Besides, the SDN technology has the ability to detect
the real time topology and to re-calculate the degree of
all nodes in network rapidly. So that, when we detect
the change of network, no matter physical or virtual,
we can re-select the key nodes (nodes have the highest
degree) and protect those new key nodes by the virtual
network components to obtain the immunity in a short
period.
5. Conclusion
In summary, we have introduced a novel method
based on complex network theory that can significantly
improve the robustness of cloud computing’s network
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Figure 5. With different number of immune nodes, the ratio of survived nodes in largest connected cluster
are significantly different. That only protect 0.05% nodes in the network will keep the ratio of survived nodes
over 50%. If the ratio of immune nodes increased to 20%, in some common cases (5% nodes are attacked
initially), ratio of survived nodes will even over 95%
to defense malicious attacks with low costs. Our ap-
proach shows that with a reasonable protection of some
key nodes in the network, significant gains can be
achieved for the robustness while the network’s func-
tional topology keep unchanged. This result reveals the
fact that instead of deploying security equipment on
each rack, protecting the key nodes with virtual net-
work security components is more efficient, economic
and energy-saving. The applications of our results are
imminent on one hand to guide the improvement of
the existing cloud computing networks but also serve
on the other hand to design future cloud infrastructures
with improved robustness.
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